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managing a wild horse with a rotten rope: a contemporary history of okinawa
Chapter One
Part Six
1-6. Exchanging Feudalism for Enlightenment
Ryukyu’s vassalage to China and Satsuma lasted until 1872. Change came as a result of domestic and external factors. Firstly, internal economic crisis afflicted Japan and Ryukyu in the early-19th century.[1] The Shogunate and daimyo had to become more frugal and institute economic reforms. Some were successful,[2] but most were not.[3] Second, was the arrival of more European vessels in the vicinity of Japan and a pattern of forced market acquisition. Ryukyu, vulnerable in location, constituted a foothold for any power seeking to challenge sakoku and 'open Japan.' Contact with foreign ships in Ryukyu had been common in the 17th and 18th centuries. Generally, a vessel would be blown off course and end up in need of food and repairs before setting off again. By the mid-19th century, however, many were warships deliberately making their way to Naha. The British and French arrived with aims in mind in the 1840’s.[4] Commodore Matthew Perry had instructions to expand America's trade in Asia and establish coaling stations along Japan's coast or in its uninhabited islands[5] and had authority to negotiate treaties. He had studied Japan and its relations with Ryukyu, and, in a report sent to US Navy command in 1852, stated that if Japan did not respond favourably to his calls for an end to sakoku he would anchor nearby in intimidatory fashion. Ryukyu was well-suited, in his view.[6] Perry’s proposal was approved by the President, though he was instructed to procure goods from islanders at fair prices and ensure his crew behaved impeccably. Force was sanctioned only if his crew came under attack.[7] Perry’s fleet arrived at Naha in May 1853.[8] Although he again petitioned Washington to go ahead with a Ryukyu occupation plan, it was rejected. After he concluded a treaty with Japan in 1854, however, Ryukyu had no leverage value. Perry had originally pushed for access to five Japanese ports, including Naha. Japanese negotiators responded to this by saying that since Ryukyu was a distant country neither the Emperor nor his government had any rights to confer access.[9]
Although sustained efforts by foreign powers forced Japan to open her ports, it was not universally welcomed, since the concluded treaties contained terms more favourable to the foreign powers than Japan.[10] It is unlikely any foreign power could have bullied the Shogunate into agreeing to such treaties if not for the weakened state of the central government and inadequacy of its internal defences. Moreover, years of isolation meant the Shogunate had only minimal knowledge about modern international diplomacy. Edo was barely able to control the regional daimyo once the sankin kotai system was relaxed: allowing them to retreat to their fortified domains, nor to prevent unrest among the hyakusho, let alone foreign intruders with advanced military know-how. A sense of desperation was illustrated by a desire to seek the assistance of the Imperial Family. The Edo government hardly got the support it was seeking, however, since the Imperial Court denounced the treaties. Thereafter, Japan divided into two main factions: those supporting sonno-joi (revere the Emperor and expel barbarians), and kaikoku (open the country). Satsuma and Choshu, two of Japan’s most powerful domains, initially supported the sonno-joi cause but shifted upon receiving a lesson in the destructive capability of foreign naval artillery. Once Satsuma and Choshu aligned with the Tosa and Hizen domains the end was near. In 1867, Tokugawa Yoshinobu surrendered government to the Emperor[11] and belatedly, in September 1869, the new era was designated as Meiji, or 'enlightenment.'
The last Chinese cefeng mission sent to Ryukyu to recognise the ascendance of King Sho Tai arrived in 1866. In 1869, the year after the Meiji Restoration (Ishin)[12] Shimazu of Satsuma relinquished control of his family domain, including Ryukyu, to the new Meiji Government. With the exception of Ryukyu these became part of the two new ken, or prefectures, of Miyazaki and Kagoshima. In September 1872, the Ryukyu Kingdom was formally renamed Ryukyu han, with Sho Tai shifting from Ryukyu koku Chuzan O to Ryukyu han O.[13] The Foreign Ministry, or gaimusho, of the Meiji Government took charge of Ryukyu han's foreign relations at the same time. Yet the han, or feudal domain unit had been abolished and replaced by ken on the Japanese mainland in 1871. This retrogressive step seems to be a result of indecision by the Meiji Government as to Ryukyu's long-term disposition, yet simultaneously a stopgap move to assert Japan's ownership under international law. This han-isation was precipitated by an incident in late-1871, when crew members of a Ryukyu vessel that ran aground in Taiwan were killed. In a brilliant piece of manoeuvring as Sino-Japanese discussions on Ryukyu's status were ongoing,[14] the Meiji Government sent a punitive force to Taiwan in 1874, claiming that retribution for the death of Japanese citizens was required in light of China’s failure to take responsibility.[15] In October 1874, China signed the Tientsin Accord recognising the legitimacy of Japan’s actions and promised compensation of 100,000 taels to the families of the slaughtered men.[16]
Finally, on 27th March 1879, Japan dispensed with any pretence surrounding Ryukyu's political status.[17] Matsuda Michiyuki, Chief Secretary of Japan's Home Affairs Ministry (naimusho), arrived at Shuri Castle and announced that Ryukyu han was officially abolished and would henceforth be known as Okinawa ken, or Okinawa Prefecture.[18] This political action is known as the Ryukyu shobun, or 'disposition of Ryukyu.' Japan’s annexation came as a shock to China, though it chose not to respond militarily. Instead, from 1880, an absorbing period of negotiations with Japan as to the best settlement of the Ryukyu sovereignty issue began. Early in these discussions ex-US President Ulysses Grant had been asked to mediate but he concluded that the issue was best settled bilaterally.[19] In actuality, it was a case of trilateral discussions since Okinawan officials were desperately putting their case in Peking and Tokyo. Talks boiled down to a Chinese proposal that all islands north of Okinawa Island, including Amami, would transfer to Japan, that China would gain Miyako and Yaeyama, and that Okinawa Island would remain a separate political entity under its own monarchy with China and Japan stationing consuls there.[20] Japan disagreed, arguing that Amami had been within Satsuma's (Japan) domain since the early-17th century. Although talks continued through the mid- to late-1880's, they did not result in diplomatic settlement. Korea's decision to, like Ryukyu, prefer its old tributary alignment system with China may have been the final straw. Regardless, Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War from 1894-95,[21] ended China's role in Ryukyu, even if debate over ownership of the Daioyu (Senkaku) Islands persists today.[22] Thus, a half-millennium relationship that survived two dynastic changes in China, 28 Ryukyu monarchs, and the conquest and domination of the tiny state by Satsuma, was over.
Administration, Land Reform, and Economic Conditions
Prior to establishment of the prefecture system (chiken) in 1879, steps were taken to shore up control of Okinawa. In 1875, the naimusho established offices in the Nishimura district of Naha[23] from which it began exercising authority over policing, the justice system, and overseas travel. Given the importance of Okinawa, high-level administrators were dispatched from Tokyo, with low-level functions also dominated by mainland Japanese,[24] many coming from the old Satsuma domain. Most of the old Ryukyu elite, no longer allowed to take part in the administration, gradually ended up losing status and forced to find their place within the general economy.[25] This became more difficult with the influx of mainland merchants and companies acquiring rights to what resources they could find. Controversially, rights to unexploited coal deposits in Iriomote were given to the Mitsui Bussan Company in 1885. Mitsui and Mitsubishi became ever larger shareholders in the Okinawan sugar industry into the 20th century. Only a few indigenous companies could compete with the investment capital and technological savvy coming in from Japan proper.[26] After annexation in 1879, Tokyo began establishing special administrative systems in Okinawa. One reason given being that Okinawans were "incapable of managing even the most basic system of self-government."[27] Obviously nonsense, but the prime goal was to rid Okinawa of all its old trappings and bring it in line with modernisation efforts continuing apace in the rest of the country. Because Okinawa was so different from other areas, however, this involved first a process of systematic nihonka, or Japanisation, in every avenue of life. This priority, added to the fact that annexation took place 11 years after the Meiji Ishin, helps explain why constitutional and other reforms were carried out later in Okinawa than in Japan proper. Okinawa’s administration did not fully resemble other Japanese prefectures until 1920.[28]
Comprehensive reforms began in earnest after the Sino-Japanese War in 1896, once the issue of Okinawa's sovereignty had finally been put to rest. Naha was named the capital of Okinawa, and the prefecture divided into the five gun administrative districts of Shimajiri, Nakagami, Kunigami (Okinawa Island), Yaeyama and Miyako (islands south of Okinawa), and the two ku of Naha and Shuri.[29] Administrative offices were established in each area and kucho and guncho heads appointed.[30] Local magiri offices (bansho) were renamed yakuba and their organisational structure was simplified. The jitodai under the Ofu system were given the position of magiricho.[31] With the enactment of the Okinawa-ken oyobi tosho chosonsei, or 'Prefecture and Small Island Town-Village System Act' of April 1908, the magiri-shima system of administration was replaced by the cho-son, or town-village system.[32] Kin magiri thereafter became Kin son.[33] The Tokyo-appointed Governor of Okinawa nominated whomever he saw fit to important posts and had the power to control most aspects of internal town and village affairs. This power of appointment was particularly frustrating when it came to budgetary allocations. Okinawa was already paying a harsh level of national taxes (kokuzei) relative to investment in infrastructure and the economy. In the post-chiken period under 2nd Governor Uesugi Shigenori,[34] Okinawa paid out 650,000-yen, but received about 450,000-yen. From this, costs of running government, policing, and shizoku stipends had to be taken.[35] Funds for public projects were allocated through gun district and local councils, but whereas ordinary members were publicly-elected, those with veto powers were not. Resolutions could often be arbitrarily voided. Local people found outsider-appointment unsettling, especially since it was overlaid with aggressive education policies stressing loyalty to the Meiji Emperor and dismissing everything Ryukyuan as unsophisticated and backward.[36] It should be pointed out, by way of balance, however, that Kin farmers were no less enamoured with the arrival of ex-shizoku class individuals from Shuri and Tomari who settled in the old areas of Ifubaru, Kishinunbaru, and Ginbaru to try their hands at agriculture.[37]
The most significant Meiji Government programme in terms of the Kin focus of this text was the Okinawa-ken tochi seiriho, or 'Land Adjustment Law,' enacted in April 1899 under the administration of the 8th Governor of Okinawa, Narahara Kogoro (Shigeru),[38] and completed by the end of 1903. It was a combination of land and tax reform, with land systems revised so as to modernise and simplify the tax collection system. Technically, the transition was simple. Under Article 6, owners of old private land classes, including shiakechi, ukechi, haraiukechi, shiakechigyo, and yashikichi,[39] received straight deed confirmation of title.[40] Arguably, the most important part of the new legislation was Article 2, which stated in the case of all lands which had been cultivated under the jiwari, or periodic land redistribution system: including jitochi, hyakushochi, oekachi, and norokumoichi,[41] that "the person in possession of the land under the last distribution would henceforth become the legal owner of that land."[42] Prevented from doing so under the old Ofu system, the hyakusho acquired tracts of land upon which they would be responsible for paying assessed taxes. This was a radical departure and, according to Nakahara Zenchu, "one of the brightest moments in Okinawa's history."[43] It was of great import to the hyakusho in that they were able to settle in one place, had the incentive to improve the quality of the land and its productivity since benefits accrued to their families, and could use the land as an asset to sell, or borrow money on, or simply let go to waste. While there had long been an affinity between farmer and land, if partly in recognition of the blood and sweat expended by ancestors in its cultivation, this was strengthened by the fact that as legal owner of the land one was now responsible for all the implications of its guardianship. It should also be noted that after land reform the farmer was better able to meet tax demands.[44] This is indicated by the fact that in the post-reform period with the shift from tax-in-kind payments to money, prefectural revenues dropped, putting Okinawa deeper in debt.[45] From a farmer's standpoint, of course, a previously undreamed of, if meagre, surplus made possible education for a child or money to fund overseas emigration.
Although land-tax reforms were egalitarian and positive, economic conditions in the early 20th century were abominable.[46] As has been typical throughout history the culprit was overpopulation relative to Okinawa's productive capacity and resource endowments. Though conjectural, aggregated wisdom points to a population figure of between 450,000 and 500,000 in 1900.[47] It was necessary to increase agricultural productivity to cope with food requirements, to expand exports to cut the deepening trade deficit, and to disperse the population to cope with rampant unemployment. While there were improvements in agricultural production and efficiency, especially in the sugar industry,[48] and in the promotion of manufactured exports,[49] the effects did not really kick in until the late-1920's and 1930's. There was still too large a workforce relative to the land available for cultivation or jobs on offer. High unemployment was a problem in Japan proper, but the rapidity of population increases and the poor state of the local economy made the situation in Okinawa more acute. Emigration had been a tool utilised by the Meiji Government for years, with the first group of farm labourers sent to Hawaii in 1868. Okinawa was late in accepting the idea, but once converted sent more people abroad than any prefecture. Between 1899 and 1938, an estimated 72,789 Okinawans emigrated,[50] the largest number to Hawaii, the Philippines, Brazil, Peru, Argentina, or Singapore. The Meiji Government initially encouraged migration from Okinawa to the islands of Yaeyama, Taiwan, or other of Japan's recent colonial acquisitions, often with development capital given as an incentive. Okinawa Governor Narahara Kogoro was opposed to the idea of sending Okinawans abroad, apparently on the grounds of poor Japanese language ability, and denied the issuance of travel permits.[51] The plan to move labour from Okinawa into plantation-type settlements in the Yaeyama islands was ineffective, however, since people believed they would end up worse off than before and in an unfamiliar and more rugged locale. Migration to the rapidly-industrialising areas of Osaka, Shinagawa, Tokyo, as well as elsewhere on the mainland, was far more successful.[52]
Private emigration initiatives were more effective than official efforts, though there was much initial resistance.[53] No one is more responsible for its popularisation than Toyama Kyuzo, known as the imin no chichi, or 'Father of Emigration.' Toyama was born in Kin in 1868, to a family of means. Unlike most in Kin he acquired a high school education, becoming an elementary school teacher in Haneji, and then Kin,[54] before moving to Tokyo. While there he became close friends with Jahana Noboru, the first Okinawan not of noble family given a government scholarship to study in Tokyo. Jahana was involved in the mainland jiyu minken undo, or 'Liberty and People's Rights Movement,'[55] and returned to challenge the policies of Governor Narahara from this perspective. Toyama remained a colleague of Jahana's on returning to Okinawa, both becoming involved in the fight to protect northern Okinawa's forests. Why Toyama seized on the idea of pushing emigration in Kin is unclear,[56] but he gathered together young farmers to contract to sugar plantations in Hawaii.[57] While he had no trouble interesting young people in the project he ran into problems, particularly financial ones, with the parents who were obliged to pay.[58] Most were opposed. Some had never even heard of Hawaii. Toyama encountered so much resistance in Kin that he had to open up the scheme to those with farm experience elsewhere in Okinawa.[59] After petitioning Okinawa Governor Narahara three or four times, Toyama finally got permission, leaving Okinawa on the ironically-named vessel, the Satsuma-maru, with a group of 30 on 5th December 1899, arriving with 27 at Honolulu on 8th January 1900.[60] From humble beginnings, Okinawan emigration took off in earnest from about 1905, increasing again around 1917. No doubt, interest was sparked by the realisation that there was economic benefit. In 1901, Kin received 576.30-yen in remittances from Hawaiian emigrants.[61] By 1902 this had risen to 1,849.40-yen and by 1903 a massive 6,919.20-yen.[62] A changed attitude toward emigration on the part of Toyama's home town is evidenced by the fact that on his second mission to Hawaii in 1903, the entire group of 45 were from Kin.[63] It is calculated that 3,225 people from Kin emigrated from 1903-1941, mostly to Hawaii, the Philippines, and Peru.[64] As such, based on total figures, we can approximate Kin's contribution to overall pre-W.W.II emigration from Okinawa to be 4.4%.[65]
As previously mentioned, somayama[66] administration and protection systems first put in place by Sai On in the 18th century was respected into the post-Meiji period. In 1880, for example, extremely violent typhoons caused havoc island-wide. Local communities had to ask the noshomusho, or Agriculture and Commerce Ministry, for permission to fell timber to rebuild properties and facilities. Old or damaged timber was given for free to the communities, as was the authority to fell fresh timber, but the latter on condition that the local people accept the costs of reforestation.[67] A large influx of persons from Japan proper in the decade or so after annexation put extra pressure again on the island's timber resources. In 1884, taking account of the higher demand for timber, the Meiji Government sensibly boosted its yearly allocation toward forest management in Okinawa to 2,500-yen,[68] factoring in reforestation requirements relative to depletion. By all accounts, official funding was short of the mark, covering about one-third of the actual costs. The remainder had to be covered by the magiri people. This caused a good deal of friction, especially in the north. Locals complained that under the old Ofu administration they were responsible for reforestation and management, but were free to take what timber they required as long as it was not of a protected variety. Now locals had to get permission to build premises from the head of the bansho and permission to cut firewood from the yamabisa. In 1885, the government tightened its forest management initiatives yet further. In September, senkaisho, or 'Ship Reform Offices,' were established in Naha, Tomari, and Yonabaru. The senkaisho took over all the responsibilities of the old soyamabugyo, kayamabugyo, and senkaibugyo,[69] which were abolished. Staff were stationed in each magiri.
The latter part of the Meiji period in Okinawa's history is dominated by the 8th Governor Narahara Kogoro. He was appointed in July 1892, remaining in office for 15 turbulent years, until April 1908. Unlike previous appointees Narahara was a reformer. Yet while much of what he accomplished benefited Okinawa long-term it would be rather an understatement to say his policies on the somayama of northern Okinawa were unpopular. In 1894, Narahara presented the naimusho of the Meiji Government with an assessment of the somayama problem. With consent, Narahara implemented a kaikon keikaku, or 'Reclamation-Cultivation Plan,' which allowed the selling off of 19,980,000-tsubo[70] of land to unemployed ex-shizoku from Shuri and Naha, mainland Japanese merchants, private local farmers, or to the magiri-village municipalities, from 1895 to 1897.[71] The purpose was to boost food production and stimulate employment in line with population increases. In theory, the land disposed of was to be of rough wasteland or barren wilderness, or genya, class.[72] In practice, pristine somayama and forested genya were included, both by accident and as a result of dodgy private deals. This incensed people in the Kunigami district where 55% of the disposed of land and most pristine forests were located. The worst-affected area was the Motobu Peninsula, especially in the magiri of Motobu, Nago, Nakijin, and Haneji.[73] Not only did these areas suffer the loss of valuable forest, but the influx of outsiders had an effect on the structure of traditional communities. In Kin, 870,000-tsubo of land was disposed of under the Narahara plan, the only consolation being that two-thirds of it ended up in the hands of Kin people.[74] Jahana Noboru, having obtained a BA degree in agriculture, returned to work at the kencho, or Prefectural Office, as an engineer in the kaikon jimusho, or 'Reclamation-Cultivation Office.' He vehemently opposed Narahara's plan, forming the Okinawa kurabu, or 'Okinawa Club,' in Naha and publishing critical opinions in the regular Okinawa Jiron, written by and for young activists. He and his colleagues on the frontlines, like Toyama Kyuzo in Kin, argued that these lands held an intangible spiritual value for the local people and that it rightly belonged them.[75] On the kaikon keikaku, at least, Jahana's activism and confrontations with Narahara had little success.[76]
By 1899, Narahara and the government's somayama policy had shifted, with a recognition of the need to conserve timber resources. Under the terms of Article 18 of the aforementioned Okinawa-ken tochi seiriho, all somayama henceforth fell under kanyu, or government administration,[77] and by the time reforms had been completed in 1903, 88% of Okinawa's somayama had become national forests.[78] Although this policy was widely praised, however, Narahara once more about-faced in his desire to boost food productivity, employment and, perhaps most importantly in this case, tax revenues. The main problem with national forests was that while a noble idea the government was responsible for their upkeep, but with no incoming taxes from those lands to offset the preservation costs. In 1906, the Okinawa-ken somayama shobun kisoko, or 'Regulations Governing Disposition of Okinawa's Timber Forest Lands,' was enacted,[79] enabling the selling of somayama to local people and municipalities. Meiji Government administration of somayama was finally abolished in March 1908, a month before Narahara left office. In most cases somayama sold on to local people was collected under a 15-year annual instalment repayment system, or nenpu shokan. From 1940, the repayment term was extended to 30-years.[80] Of most interest in this regard is that the Kin people collectively, mostly using remittances sent home by those working in Japan proper or by overseas emigrants, bought all the somayama offered for sale to ensure long-term preservation and out of respect for the spirits of their ancestors. By the time of W.W.II, not one tsubo of Kin's somayama remained in the hands of the government, all being owned by private individuals or municipalities. Kin was unique amongst the towns and villages of Northern Okinawa Island in this respect and great pride was derived from it.[81]
[1] Ryukyu was hit by typhoons, earthquakes, tidal waves, droughts, famines, and epidemics which claimed and estimated 20,000 lives. Considering the size of the population of Ryukyu at the time this was a very heavy toll. Kerr puts the population at between 150,000-200,000. George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (1958), 241. Sakihara Mitsugu states that whilst the population stood at 100,000 at the start of the 17th century it had risen to 280,000 by the mid-19th century. Sakihara Mitsugu The Significance of Ryukyu in Satsuma Finances During the Tokugawa Period (1971), 211. Yet these were not exclusive conditions. Strange weather hit Japan in the 1830’s, creating wide scale famine and high loss of life.
[2] A wonderful irony of the Tokugawa social hierarchy was that the lowly merchant class had become the most powerful segment of society by the 19th century. Sakihara Mitsugu estimates that in 1830 Satsuma was in debt to Osaka merchants to the sum of 5 million ryo of gold (5 million ryo of gold was equivalent to 320,000 kan of silver. One kan of silver was equivalent to 3.75 kilogrammes, or 8.27 pounds). Since annual income was somewhere in the region of 150,000-185,000 ryo of gold, and given the annual interest rate stood at 12% Shimazu is said to have announced it would take him 250 years to repay. Contrary to expectations, he restructured the terms of his debts so that he was now only obliged to pay 20,000 ryo per year and had amassed a sizeable reserve fund within 20 years. He had become adept at merchant capitalism. Most successful daimyo reformers followed the same route. Contributing factors in the case of Satsuma included improved sugar production and transportation, price manipulation to protect his monopoly on sugar, heavier local taxation, along with semi-legal (China-Ryukyu) and illegal (direct foreign intercourse and smuggling) trade. To this one should also add a capacity for guile. To give two examples of incoming revenues for Shimazu after his reforms, sugar exports brought in close to 25,000 ryo per year from 1830-1839, and Ryukyu-China trade some 70,000 ryo. Sakihara Mitsugu The Significance of Ryukyu in Satsuma Finances During the Tokugawa Period (1971), 221, 228 and 240.
[3] The Shogunate belatedly responded to this in the 1840’s. Officials were accused of fraud or wasteful use of government revenues and dismissed in large number. Merchants, and the daimyo with whom they were in cahoots, were charged with manipulation of the price of basic goods, creating wild fluctuations that benefited the manipulators but was bad for the general population. Try as it may, however, the government only ever had limited success in destroying this system and breaking daimyo monopolies. It fared better in increasing its revenues by ordering contributions from merchants for land reclamation and redistribution projects and by instituting the agechi rei system, by which daimyo were obliged to return portions of their fiefs to Edo control. Obviously, the daimyo disliked this sudden reassertion of Tokugawa authority after years of relative autonomy. It should be seen as an important motivating factor in the revolution that would follow.
[4] In 1844, the French ship Alcmene docked at Naha demanding establishment of trade relations. Shuri, under orders from Satsuma, refused. Likewise when the British vessel Starling arrived in 1846. Both countries were permitted to leave a missionary behind ostensibly for language study. Although records kept by the Frenchman Forcade and the Hungarian-born British representative Bettelheim are of interest now, Shuri regarded them as a nuisance. Bettelheim abused the hospitality accorded him in myriad ways. Moreover, it was he who presented an American naval commander with a less-than-flattering portrait of Ryukyu in 1848. For a description of problems caused by Bettelheim see George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 279-295. For an account of missionaries in Ryukyu see Edward E. Bollinger, On the Threshold of a Closed Empire: Mid-19th Century Missions in Okinawa (Pasadena, California: William Carey Library, 1991).
[5] The Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands located south of Tokyo at about the same latitude as Ryukyu were targeted. Miyasato Seigen, 'Perry raiko,' in Hosoya Chihiro, ed. Nichibei kankeishi: masatsu to kyocho no 130 nen (Tokyo: Yuhikakusensho, 1982), 175-178.
[6] Because it was under the control of one of Japan’s most powerful daimyo, but that the people of Ryukyu had suffered only oppression under this regime. In his own words, "liberating the islanders from this regime and occupying the region would be the most appropriate and morally-correct course of action. As far as I am concerned, it would improve the lives of the islanders. Without doubt, they [Ryukyuans] would welcome America." Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 319.
[7] Contrary to instructions he threatened and applied force. On 25th July, he told Shuri that if he were not allowed access or lease to required facilities and areas for a coaling station and trading purposes, he would send 200 troops to occupy Shuri castle. The Ryukyu government surrendered unconditionally.
[8] On Perry’s visit see Kerr’s Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 297-341, and Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 313-330. For the more curious, see Hokama Seisho's excellent Commodore Perry's Visit to Okinawa: Selections From Narratives of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan (Naha: Kyuyodo Shobo, 1975).
[9] George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 330. This was confirmation of Perry’s impression that Ryukyu was an independent entity. On returning to Naha, therefore, he concluded a treaty specifically related to American interests. The 'Compact between the United States and the Ryukyu Kingdom' was signed in July 1854, and ratified by the US Senate the following year. Since Japan had been prised open there was little subsequent interest in Ryukyu. Only later, when the US gained control over Okinawa after W.W.II, does this interlude take on a renewed significance.
[10] The Ryukyu-US treaty was typical. Americans were "at liberty to ramble where they please, without hindrance, or having officials sent to follow them." If they committed crimes while in port they would be punished by "the captain of the ship to which they belong" rather than local authorities. George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (1958), 335. The concept of extraterritoriality: a foreign citizen being immune from local penalties for crimes, was born during this period, but one still sees it within the various 'Status of Forces Agreements' (SOFA) governing the treatment of US troops stationed abroad. This is especially pertinent in the case of Okinawa.
[11] Some stragglers attempted to resist the inevitable, escaping to Hokkaido and establishing an Ezo Republic with its administrative capital at Goryokaku, but this was crushed in May 1869.
[12] The goal of the Meiji Government was to centralise power and build a modern nation state to rival those in the Cultural West. The 'Five Article Charter Oath,' in May 1868, decreed that social and administrative systems were to become egalitarian and Japan more outward-looking. The affairs of the nation would be decided by democratic debate, and the old social hierarchy eliminated so that all could contribute to national restructuring and have freedom to strive for their goals. Tokugawa practices were discarded as obsolete and attention focussed on the acquisition of knowledge and technology from 'the world.' Underpinning this was an emerging nationalism, inspired by scholars like Fukuzawa Yukichi. In his Bunmeiron no gairyaku (1875), he argued that just as an individual can attain independence and enlightenment through education, this could as well apply to a nation. By learning from the Cultural West, and by creating a modern nation state with the Emperor at the helm, Japan could rise to become independent While foreign influences varied in importance during the Meiji period the motto was constant: wakon-yosai, or 'Japanese spirit, Western learning.'
[13] The closest equivalent for this strange term being the 'Rajah of Ryukyu.' Sho Tai was summoned to Tokyo to pay respects to the Emperor, but declined, apparently feigning illness. A small delegation from Ryukyu sent on Sho Tai's behalf did meet with the Japanese Foreign Minister on 14th October 1872, whereupon the following Imperial rescript was read aloud: "We have here succeeded to the Imperial Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal and now reign over all the land. Ryukyu, situated to the south, has the same race, habits and language, and has always been loyal to Satsuma. We appreciate this loyalty, and here raise you to the peerage and appoint you King of Ryukyu han. You, Sho Tai, take responsibility in the administration of the han, and assist us eternally." George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 363.
[14] Soyeshima Taneomi arrived in Peking as Ambassador to China in May 1873. One of his first actions was to make clear to the Chinese Government that Ryukyu was part of the Japanese Empire.
[15] From the time of Shimazu’s invasion of Ryukyu and the start of dual vassalage to China and Satsuma, China had not minded. As Ta-Tuan Ch’en argues, such arrangements were not uncommon in China itself, or in East Asia. Ta-Tuan Ch’en, 'Investiture of the Liu-Ch’iu Kings' in Fairbank, J.K., ed. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (1968), 164. While Ryukyu honoured tributary commitments the Qing Court did not frown on third-party agreements. In contrast, Japan was influenced by Europe's nation state system and sought to establish clear territorial boundaries. As such, Ryukyu's tributary relationship could not be tolerated. Because Ryukyu had long been recognised internationally as an autonomous state, however, Japan had to tread very carefully or risk being seen as overly aggressive. As a result, the Ryukyu question was conducted in the context of contemporary ('Western') international diplomacy.
[16] With the prospect of war with Japan looming, China saw it as practical to recognise the legality of Japan’s actions in the matter. A minor agreement in the whole scheme of things for China, and certainly no final settlement of the sovereignty issue, but it was a triumph for Japan that could now claim, with a degree of international legitimacy, that Peking had recognised Ryukyu to be Japanese. This lapse in concentration undermined later Chinese claims of sovereignty.
[17] Shuri repeatedly asked the Qing Court for help as Japan sought to tighten control but none came. While this could be seen as a betrayal on China's part there was far more complexity to it. China has never backed down on its claims of sovereignty over Ryukyu. It clearly felt it had been swindled in the 'Taiwan Incident.' At the same time, China was embroiled in internal debate over the relevance of the tributary system when faced with the modern nation state system so effectively adopted by Japan. Much like the pre-Meiji sonno joi-kaikoku ideological division, Qing government factions were split in their defence or opposition to the tributary system. Conservatives believed China was morally obliged to stand up for those who had voluntarily recognised the Emperor as sovereign, even if this led to war. Reformists felt the tributary system had outlived its usefulness and that China should concentrate on internal defence rather than unimportant peripheral states. Edwin Pak-Wah Leung's China's Quasi-War with Japan: The Dispute over the Ryukyu (Liu Ch'iu) Islands, 1871-1881, (University of California Santa Barbara, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1978) is required reading for anyone seeking a comprehensive discussion.
[18] Ota Chofu, Okinawa-kensei gojunen (Naha: Okinawa Sha, 1933), 31.
[19] From the American standpoint this was a tricky issue. In Washington, the primary concern was making sure that Perry's US-Ryukyu Friendship Treaty would be honoured under whatever political settlement was finalised.
[20] The post-annexation China-Japan-Ryukyu debate is covered in US OSS, The Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands: A Japanese Minority Group, reprinted in Okinawa-kenshi, Shiryohen 2 (1996), 62-68.
[21] Japan was determined to secure control over Korea, much as Hideyoshi had tried three centuries before. This time Japan was prepared, and happy to pit its military against China should it come to the rescue of its long-standing tributary. Although war with China (in Korea) began in July 1894, a remarkable display of military prowess found Japan in control of most of Korea by September’s end. By February 1895, Japan had progressed from Korea into China, entering Manchuria, the Liaotung Peninsula, and Weihaiwei. From these positions it was in striking distance of Peking. Recognising defeat, Chinese surrender terms with Japan were negotiated at Shimonoseki in April. China handed Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, though subsequent international pressure led to the elimination of the latter region from the treaty.
[22] For the Daioyu Island controversy from China's perspective see Suganuma Unryu, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Daioyu/Senkaku Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000).
[23] One explanation for the choice of Naha over Shuri being that the Meiji Government wanted to make a highly visible break with Okinawa's Shuri-centric past. Kin-choshi, 211.
[24] Police officers were appointed exclusively from other Japanese prefectures. Police stations were set up in each of Okinawa's magiri districts. Kin-choshi, 210.
[25] Some families of Ryukyu nobility continued to receive stipends recognising status in the form of government bonds, but the goal of the Meiji Government was to whittle down the old social hierarchy. The most successful of the former nobility used stipends to set themselves up in business. Most failed to come to grips with economic realities. Many of the old shizoku class residing in Shuri, Naha, and Tomari were given funds and relocated in the north of Okinawa Island to cultivate areas of land, much of it of low quality. On the north-relocated shizoku see Higashi-son, Higashi-sonshi - daiikken tsushihen (Higashi: Higashi-son Shihenshu Iinkai, 1987), 69-72.
[26] This has been typical of mainland-Okinawa relations since Meiji. Japanese firms were also major economic beneficiaries of the postwar base construction programme, and wasted no time in seizing control of Okinawa's tourist industry after reversion in 1972.
[27] "Mindo ga hikuku jichisei o uneisuru noryoku ga nai." Kin-cho, Kin-cho to kichi (1991), 10. This rather derogatory kind of statement is almost certainly the result of Tokyo's frustration with the failure of Okinawan officials to move forward with modernisation policies ordered after the creation of Ryukyu han. Indeed, one of the justifications for annexation in 1879 was Shuri's failure to carry out a set of five directives given by the then Home Affairs Minister Okubo Toshimichi in 1875. For the directives see Ota Chofu, Okinawa-kensei gojunen (1933), 25, and George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 368.
[28] Ota Chofu, a Tokyo-educated journalist, saw the process in Okinawa taking place over four distinct periods. From 1879 to 1895, the prefectural administration was shifted from the seat of the old royal dynasty at Shuri to a new purpose-built office at Naha. Mainland Japanese moved into all of the key government positions, but there was little in the way of radical change. The next period, from 1896 to 1908, saw major shifts. Land reform, tax reform, the introduction of military conscription, and the start of the reorganisation of Okinawa’s districts. The shift to the Japanese shi-cho-son system was largely completed from 1909-1919, as was the electoral system which gave Okinawa five representatives in the Japanese Diet. Finally, and from 1920, Okinawa, at least in terms of structure, resembled any other in the Japanese Empire. Ota Chofu, Okinawa-kensei gojunen (1933), 188-189.
[29] Nakahara Zenchu, Ryukyu no rekishi (1978), 145.
[30] In the case of Kunigami, firstly in Oyakawa Village, Haneji magiri. In 1882, they were moved to Oganuku Village, Nago magiri. Kin-choshi, 213.
[31] In communities distant from Naha remnants of the old Ofu structure persisted into the 20th century.
[32] The term aza gradually replaced mura in identifying older villages within villages. In the case of Kin and Ginoza, for example, once each of these municipalities was officially given son (mura) status the same word could not be used to describe smaller internal units lest confusion reign supreme. Unfortunately, if perhaps necessarily, however, the use of aza has had an homogenising effect, with only the local people remembering the location of the old shima units. Aza is used primarily by the Post Office, with number designations replacing place names.
[33] The district boundaries of Kin remained the same until April 1946, when the villages of Kanna, Soke, Ginoza, and Kocha were separated to create Ginoza son, reducing Kin’s land area by at least one-third. Kin son came to consist of the five ku, or districts of Yaka, Igei, Kin, Namisato, and Nakagawa. An increase in population as a result of the construction of Camp Hansen and the Vietnam War economic boost led to Kin being officially given cho, or town, status in 1980.
[34] There is insufficient space to detail the policies of each Tokyo-appointed Governor of Okinawa or to discuss the myriad changes that occurred after 1879. For individual governors and their policies prior to Narahara Kogoro see Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 412-429. On post-Meiji changes in detail see Ota Chofu, Okinawa-kensei gojunen (1933). It should be noted that much of the information on post-Meiji Okinawa in Kerr's Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), particularly chapters 9 and 10, was based on translations from Ota Chofu's text.
[35] Kin-choshi, 213. Some had been subsidised with government capital to cultivate areas of land.
[36] Looked at dispassionately, Meiji education policy was egalitarian. The National Education Act of 1872 was designed to discourage regional loyalties among all citizens of the Empire and foster a sense of national identification as Japanese. All were encouraged to be good Imperial subjects. Though the shock was more pronounced in Okinawa since people had traditionally pledged loyalty to their own King, one should not disregard difficulties mainlanders had accepting the existence of an Emperor. It should be noted there was resistance to the national homogenisation process that began after Meiji in Japan and Okinawa. In Japan proper groups and individuals were involved in anti-cultural assimilation efforts and known collectively as the mingei movement. The goal was to preserve and encourage traditional arts and crafts throughout Japan to counter the homogeneity of the whole modernity project. Other mainlanders, like folklorist Yanagita Kunio and linguist Origichi Shinobu argued against the eradication of Okinawan culture on the grounds that it provided clues to the origins of the modern Japanese. A reappraisal of Okinawa's place in the universe was being conducted by local scholars like Iha Fuyu. Iha challenged the notion that Okinawa was backward or inferior, arguing that if such was the perception on the mainland then the years of Satsuma exploitation should be regarded as the cause. These works of Okinawan studies (Okinawa gaku) pioneered by Iha in the early 20th century continue to influence the way Okinawans see themselves and their place vis-à-vis Japan.
[37] Kin-choshi, 212. Based on figures from 1903, there were 1,151 persons of ex-shizoku class living in Kin magiri who had been relocated from Shuri, Naha, and Tomari. Given that the population of Kin magiri was then 7,149, ex-shizoku accounted for 16% of the total population. The arrival of ex-shizoku was most pronounced in Motobu magiri, where the new arrivals constituted 35% of the population. Higashi-son, Higashi-sonshi - daiikken tsushihen (1987), 69.
[38] Narahara had been hanshi, or 'Chief Retainer,' for Shimazu of Satsuma. A fearsome figure by all accounts, he became governor in 1892, but had first been dispatched to Okinawa with Ijichi Sadaka in 1872 to prepare the ground prior to annexation.
[39] Lands in the Shuri and Naha districts upon which residences were built.
[41] Although norokumoichi is covered under the terms of Article 2, and as previously stated, these lands were commonly administered by the noro on a contract-in system rather than, in most cases, by jiwari. Former norokumoichi ownership seems to have ended up in the hands of the noro family.
[43] Nakahara Zenchu, Ryukyu no rekishi (Naha: Bunkyo Tosho, 1978), 148. The official Kin histories are no less excited by this development. Others discuss it with a greater degree of detachment.
[44] Nakahara Zenchu, Ryukyu no rekishi (1978), 148.
[45] In 1903 income for an area that used to yield 460,000-yen under the old tax-in-kind system now yielded just 126,000-yen. George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 426.
[46] While one finds references to the increase in prostitution in Okinawa early in the 20th century, what one rarely finds in histories is the quite common practice of selling one's children on for adoption. Such information is only revealed by talking to local people. Adoption once again became common in the post-W.W.II period, with many Okinawan children going to America. It should be stressed that there was no monetary element to these adoptions. Poverty was such that families saw children having the chance of a better life in the US. Families being split for economic reasons at this time, however, is the cause of great pain to many people today. Infrequent reunions are extremely emotional events for all concerned. On child-selling see Pitts F.R., W.P. Lebra and W.P. Suttles, Postwar Okinawa, (Washington, DC: Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, 1955), 39-40.
[47] In a survey conducted in 1879, Okinawa's total population is given as 310,545 people. A survey in 1880 gives a figure of 351,374 people, indicating an increase of 40,829 persons, or 13%, in just one year. This he sets against the national census figure of 577,588 in 1929. Ota Chofu, Okinawa-kensei gojunen (1933), 41.
[48] In 1912, a centrifugal sugar mill was established at Kadena, and by 1939 there were five spread throughout the islands, supported by hundreds of small black sugar mills. By the late-1930’s, sugar accounted for almost two-thirds of industrial production and exports. The main reason for the Okinawa sugar industry's upturn was the decreased importation of sugarcane from abroad during W.W.I. Miyagi Eisho, Okinawa no rekishi (1968), 200. See Miyagi's discussion of the 1914 Sangyo 10-nen keikaku, or 'Ten-Year Plan for Okinawan Industry.'
[49] With textiles, including tsumugi silk, hats, jofu and cotton cloth, the chief exports.
[50] Kin-choshi, 408-409.
[51] Toyama Kyuzo's disagreements with Narahara on this issue are now the stuff of legend. Kaneshiro Takeo, ed. Kyuzo Toyama: Father of Okinawan Immigrants - Okinawa imin no chichi: Toyama Kyuzo Japanese and English texts (Los Angeles: Japan Printing, 1959), 5.
[52] Nakahara states that there were 72,000 persons from Okinawa living and working on the mainland in 1938. Nakahara Zenchu, Ryukyu no rekishi (1978), 157. In Shinagawa and Osaka mostly factory labour was required. In Tokyo, Okinawans worked as teachers, nurses, government administration, and in companies.
[53] Governor Narahara Kogoro being the greatest impediment.
[54] Toyama is recorded as becoming the principal of Kin Elementary in 1893, at the age of 25. At the same time, there are disagreements as to his precise term of office, with some suggesting he was in the post for a matter of a few months. Hunt around and one will find historians arguing that Toyama never became Kin Elementary principal. As is often the case with people who later rise to become legendary figures it is difficult to sift through the complex mix of fact and fiction.
[55] The jiyu minken undo sprung up in opposition to the philosophical basis of the Meiji Ishin which set the Imperial Family at the head of the nation and advocated the introduction of ideas from abroad. Rather than the rights of the Emperor, it was argued, the rights of common men and women should be restored. The movement found its roots amongst land-owning agriculturists and former samurai, some of whom were somewhat disillusioned with their new, less important status. Jahana was not cut from this kind of cloth. Born into a farming family of modest means in Kochinda-son, southern Okinawa Island, in 1865, Jahana was a man of unquestionable principle, of great intelligence, and an unselfish political activist supporting the rights of the common man and woman. There are a large number of references on Jahana to be found. See, by way of reverential introduction, Ota Masahide, Kindai Okinawa no seiji koso (Tokyo: Keigusa Shobo, 1972), 126-141, Nakahara Zenchu, Ryukyu no rekishi (1978), 149-152. On Jahana Noboru and the jiyu minken undo in Okinawa see Okinawa-kenshi: tsushi, 372-406. For specific Jahana Noboru studies and edited materials see Osato Koei, Jahana Noboruden: Okinawa kaiho no senkusha (Tokyo: Taihei Shuppansha, 1970), and Chinen Zennei, editor. Shiryo: nogakushi Jahana Noboru (Haebaru: Naha Shuppansha, 1983).
[56] Nakahara suggests that the spark for Toyama came on encountering a book entitled Shokuminron, which discussed the idea of overseas settlement. Nakahara Zenchu, Ryukyu no rekishi (1978), 155.
[57] Which had recently become part of the United States, in 1898.
[58] Passage by ship from Okinawa to Yokohama cost 5-yen, and from Yokohama to Hawaii 300-yen.
[59] The resistance Toyama originally found to his ideas in Kin seems to be less focussed on these days as the town defines itself in its literature as the birthplace of Okinawan emigration. In the final group of 26 people arriving at the Ewa plantation in Oahu, Hawaii, 16 were from outside Kin. The breakdown is as follows: 1 person from each of the municipalities of Hateruma, Nishihara, Haebaru, and Itoman, 3 persons from Oroku, 3 from Shuri, and 6 from Naha. The ages of those involved ranged from 21-35. Kin-choshi, 417.
[60] Three of the party disappeared whilst in mainland Japan. 27 people got to the immigration counter in Honolulu but one person from Oroku failed the medical inspection.
[63] Shin Okinawa Bungaku 45 (1980), 307.
[64] Ibid., 146-147. The overwhelming majority from the Kin or Namisato districts of Kin.
[65] Kin emigrants calculated against the total of 72,789 given as a total Okinawa figure to 1938.
[66] Technically, somayama are areas of mountain or field on which trees grow and from which timber can be cut. A lengthier description can be found in Okinawa-kenshi - tsushi, 420.
[69] The soyamabugyo has already been discussed in this chapter.
[70] One tsubo equals approximately 3.3 sq. metres.
[72] So-called genya is a complex category. Traditionally the lowest grade of land for the farmer in terms of cultivation, grass- or shrub-covered genya was recognised by Sai On as necessary for land conservation because of the soil binding that prevented runoff and flash floods. Glacken has stated of the genya in the Matsuda district of Ginoza, however, that it is often "indistinguishable from forest." Clarence Glacken, The Great Loochoo: A Study of Okinawan Village Life (1960), 115. Chapter 6 of this book (110-130) is of value to anyone interested in traditional Okinawan land use systems.
[73] Ogimi and Kunigami magiri further north in Kunigami-gun were similarly affected.
[74] Kin-choshi, 77. 261,000-tsubo went to Shuri-Naha shizoku, and nothing to Japanese mainlanders.
[75] The conflicting theories are generally given as Jahana's minchi-minkiron versus Narahara's kanchi-minkiron. Basically, Jahana argued that the land and trees belonged to the people, whilst Narahara asserted that the trees belonged to the people but that use of the land was for the government to decide. Miyagi Eisho, Okinawa no rekishi (1968), 189. Could be minmoku? Check.
[76] Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 443-447.
[78] Kin-choshi, 75. See Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 447-449, for details on the amount of land involved and the classifications.
[79] Okinawa-ken somayama shobun kisoko presented in full in Kin-choshi, 83-86.
[80] Kin-cho to kichi, 10.
[81] Kin-cho to kichi, 11. As will be discussed in a later chapter, Kin's uniqueness in this regard has persisted, albeit in a different way. By the terms of Kyukan ni yoru Kin-cho koyu zaisan no kanrito ni kansuru jorei, or 'Ordinance on the Administration of Kin's Publicly-Owned Estates in Accordance with Old Customs' (Jorei daiichigo, promulgated 6th January 1982, amended 24th December 1982, and 24th May 1991), Kin families receive a yearly payment of between 150,000-250,000-yen out of the land rentals payments for somayama within the confines of US military bases in recognition of the Meiji period somayama purchases. No other municipality has this kind of statute on its books.
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