The Okinawa senso was the last major campaign of the Pacific War. On 26^th March 1945, Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief and Fleet Admiral of the US Navy for the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, launched an attack on the Kerama Islands, thereby beginning a military campaign known as 'Operation Iceberg.' The US military judged that it would be necessary to launch a full-scale assault and occupation of Japan to bring war to an end. The first step was the aforementioned the capture of Okinawa: 'Operation Iceberg.' It was envisaged this campaign would take 6 months to complete.[1] The capture of Okinawa was crucial. Summed up in the 1^st April 1945, New York Times, "If Okinawa can be taken this will bring Taiwan, the Chinese coast, and mainland Japan within range of our B-29 bombers…for Japan, Ryukyu is the final floating fortress."[2] At Japan’s Imperial Headquarters, or daihonei, on 20^th January 1945, a teikoku rikkaigun sakusen taiko, or 'Outline of the Imperial Army and Navy’s Tactics,' was approved. It stipulated that a fushin strategy would be used. That is, setting up a frontline along areas within Japan's territory but distant from the main islands. A deep battle line was drawn across from the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands, to Okinawa Island, and further to Taiwan. These areas would be vigorously defended to prevent invasion of the "sacred earth."[3]

Although one or two pockets of resistance remained, after 89 days of fierce warfare the Okinawa senso ended in an American victory. The overwhelming military superiority of the US forces might have been sufficient to end the campaign far sooner in different circumstances. Heavy bombardment proved successful initially, hence the reference to the war as the tetsu no bofu, or 'Wind of Steel,' but as the activities of the Japanese defence forces in the northern region demonstrate, the US task of completing the operation became far more complex and laborious. The guerrilla warfare conducted was savage. Only when the dust settled could the true magnitude of it all be assessed. Some 94,136 Japanese soldiers, including Okinawan conscripts and boeitai, along with 12,281 American soldiers were killed. Yet the civilian death toll is estimated as being between 130,000-150,000 people: close to one-third of the non-evacuated population of Okinawa. It is also estimated that as many as 10,000 non-Japanese or Okinawans, mostly Koreans, were killed in the battle or executed by the retreating Japanese forces. Of the civilian figure, while many had been slaughtered in the heavy shelling as they sought to find safety or as a result of having been ejected from their hiding holes by retreating Japanese troops ostensibly there to defend them, a disturbingly high number of people committed suicide in quite hideous circumstances.[4] Some Okinawans were executed by Japanese forces on the flimsy premise they had provided military secrets to the enemy. It will be recalled, of course, that the primary objective of the Okinawa senso was "to protect the sacred earth of the Imperial homeland," of which Okinawa was never a part. This may help explain some of what transpired on Okinawa.

Over the course of its history Okinawa has undergone many a transformation. Some have been internally-preconsidered and deliberate: as in the shift from insular island kingdom to cosmopolitan trading nation under China's in the late-14^th century, and the decision to revert to Japan in 1972. We may argue that political and economic considerations were key mitigating factors, yet neither transformation was inevitable. Chuzan actively pursued a relationship system with China, as did the general mass of the Okinawan people seek reversion. In other cases transformation was eventually accommodated but externally-induced. Shimazu’s invasion in 1609, brought an end to Ryukyu's political and economic autonomy, even if the illusion dimly persisted, while the Meiji Government’s annexation in 1879 led to cultural absorption and structural dependency on Japan. In all cases, however, change was a relatively gradual process. Shimazu invaded on a specific day, but it had been anticipated. Reversion was put in motion over a decade before it occurred. Although the likelihood of war was certainly considered from the latter part of the 1930's, the hard, cold reality could not have been imagined. The Okinawa senso was the most radical and cataclysmic event in the small island region's history, bar none.