The last Chinese cefeng mission sent to Ryukyu to recognise the ascendance of King Sho Tai arrived in 1866. In 1869, the year after the Meiji Restoration (ishin)[1] Shimazu of Satsuma relinquished control of his family domain, including Ryukyu, to the new Meiji Government. With the exception of Ryukyu these became part of the two new ken, or prefectures, of Miyazaki and Kagoshima. In September 1872, the Ryukyu Kingdom was formally renamed Ryukyu han, with Sho Tai shifting from Ryukyu koku Chuzan O to Ryukyu han O.[2] The Foreign Ministry, or gaimusho, of the Meiji Government took charge of Ryukyu han's foreign relations at the same time. Yet the han, or feudal domain unit had been abolished and replaced by ken on the Japanese mainland in 1871. This retrogressive step seems to be a result of indecision by the Meiji Government as to Ryukyu's long-term disposition, yet simultaneously a stopgap move to assert Japan's ownership under international law. This han-isation was precipitated by an incident in late-1871, when crew members of a Ryukyu vessel that ran aground in Taiwan were killed. In a brilliant piece of manoeuvring as Sino-Japanese discussions on Ryukyu's status were ongoing,[3] the Meiji Government sent a punitive force to Taiwan in 1874, claiming that retribution for the death of Japanese citizens was required in light of China’s failure to take responsibility.[4] In October 1874, China signed the Tientsin Accord recognising the legitimacy of Japan’s actions and promised compensation of 100,000 taels to the families of the slaughtered men.[5]
Finally, on 27th March 1879, Japan dispensed with any pretence surrounding Ryukyu's political status.[6] Matsuda Michiyuki, Chief Secretary of Japan's Home Affairs Ministry (naimusho), arrived at Shuri Castle and announced that Ryukyu han was officially abolished and would henceforth be known as Okinawa ken, or Okinawa Prefecture.[7] This political action is known as the Ryukyu shobun, or 'disposition of Ryukyu.' Japan’s annexation came as a shock to China, though it chose not to respond militarily. Instead, from 1880, an absorbing period of negotiations with Japan as to the best settlement of the Ryukyu sovereignty issue began. Early in these discussions ex-US President Ulysses Grant had been asked to mediate but he concluded that the issue was best settled bilaterally.[8] In actuality, it was a case of trilateral discussions since Okinawan officials were desperately putting their case in Peking and Tokyo. Talks boiled down to a Chinese proposal that all islands north of Okinawa Island, including Amami, would transfer to Japan, that China would gain Miyako and Yaeyama, and that Okinawa Island would remain a separate political entity under its own monarchy with China and Japan stationing consuls there.[9] Japan disagreed, arguing that Amami had been within Satsuma's (Japan) domain since the early-17th century. Although talks continued through the mid- to late-1880's, they did not result in diplomatic settlement. Korea's decision to, like Ryukyu, prefer its old tributary alignment system with China may have been the final straw. Regardless, Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War from 1894-95,[10] ended China's role in Ryukyu, even if debate over ownership of the Daioyu (Senkaku) Islands persists today.[11] Thus, a half-millennium relationship that survived two dynastic changes in China, 28 Ryukyu monarchs, and the conquest and domination of the tiny state by Satsuma, was over.
[1] The goal of the Meiji Government was to centralise power and build a modern nation state to rival those in the Cultural West. The 'Five Article Charter Oath,' in May 1868, decreed that social and administrative systems were to become egalitarian and Japan more outward-looking. The affairs of the nation would be decided by democratic debate, and the old social hierarchy eliminated so that all could contribute to national restructuring and have freedom to strive for their goals. Tokugawa practices were discarded as obsolete and attention focussed on the acquisition of knowledge and technology from 'the world.' Underpinning this was an emerging nationalism, inspired by scholars like Fukuzawa Yukichi. In his Bunmeiron no gairyaku (1875), he argued that just as an individual can attain independence and enlightenment through education, this could as well apply to a nation. By learning from the Cultural West, and by creating a modern nation state with the Emperor at the helm, Japan could rise to become independent While foreign influences varied in importance during the Meiji period the motto was constant: wakon-yosai, or 'Japanese spirit, Western learning.'
[2] The closest equivalent for this strange term being the 'Rajah of Ryukyu.' Sho Tai was summoned to Tokyo to pay respects to the Emperor, but declined, apparently feigning illness. A small delegation from Ryukyu sent on Sho Tai's behalf did meet with the Japanese Foreign Minister on 14th October 1872, whereupon the following Imperial rescript was read aloud: "We have here succeeded to the Imperial Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal and now reign over all the land. Ryukyu, situated to the south, has the same race, habits and language, and has always been loyal to Satsuma. We appreciate this loyalty, and here raise you to the peerage and appoint you King of Ryukyu han. You, Sho Tai, take responsibility in the administration of the han, and assist us eternally." George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 363.
[3] Soyeshima Taneomi arrived in Peking as Ambassador to China in May 1873. One of his first actions was to make clear to the Chinese Government that Ryukyu was part of the Japanese Empire.
[4] From the time of Shimazu’s invasion of Ryukyu and the start of dual vassalage to China and Satsuma, China had not minded. As Ta-Tuan Ch’en argues, such arrangements were not uncommon in China itself, or in East Asia. Ta-Tuan Ch’en, 'Investiture of the Liu-Ch’iu Kings' in Fairbank, J.K., ed. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (1968), 164. While Ryukyu honoured tributary commitments the Qing Court did not frown on third-party agreements. In contrast, Japan was influenced by Europe's nation state system and sought to establish clear territorial boundaries. As such, Ryukyu's tributary relationship could not be tolerated. Because Ryukyu had long been recognised internationally as an autonomous state, however, Japan had to tread very carefully or risk being seen as overly aggressive. As a result, the Ryukyu question was conducted in the context of contemporary ('Western') international diplomacy.
[5] With the prospect of war with Japan looming, China saw it as practical to recognise the legality of Japan’s actions in the matter. A minor agreement in the whole scheme of things for China, and certainly no final settlement of the sovereignty issue, but it was a triumph for Japan that could now claim, with a degree of international legitimacy, that Peking had recognised Ryukyu to be Japanese. This lapse in concentration undermined later Chinese claims of sovereignty.
[6] Shuri repeatedly asked the Qing Court for help as Japan sought to tighten control but none came. While this could be seen as a betrayal on China's part there was far more complexity to it. China has never backed down on its claims of sovereignty over Ryukyu. It clearly felt it had been swindled in the 'Taiwan Incident.' At the same time, China was embroiled in internal debate over the relevance of the tributary system when faced with the modern nation state system so effectively adopted by Japan. Much like the pre-Meiji sonno joi-kaikoku ideological division, Qing government factions were split in their defence or opposition to the tributary system. Conservatives believed China was morally obliged to stand up for those who had voluntarily recognised the Emperor as sovereign, even if this led to war. Reformists felt the tributary system had outlived its usefulness and that China should concentrate on internal defence rather than unimportant peripheral states. Edwin Pak-Wah Leung's China's Quasi-War with Japan: The Dispute over the Ryukyu (Liu Ch'iu) Islands, 1871-1881, (University of California Santa Barbara, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1978) is required reading for anyone seeking a comprehensive discussion.
[7] Ota Chofu, Okinawa-kensei gojunen (Naha: Okinawa Sha, 1933), 31.
[8] From the American standpoint this was a tricky issue. In Washington, the primary concern was making sure that Perry's US-Ryukyu Friendship Treaty would be honoured under whatever political settlement was finalised.
[9] The post-annexation China-Japan-Ryukyu debate is covered in US OSS, The Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands: A Japanese Minority Group, reprinted in Okinawa-kenshi, Shiryohen 2 (1996), 62-68.
[10] Japan was determined to secure control over Korea, much as Hideyoshi had tried three centuries before. This time Japan was prepared, and happy to pit its military against China should it come to the rescue of its long-standing tributary. Although war with China (in Korea) began in July 1894, a remarkable display of military prowess found Japan in control of most of Korea by September’s end. By February 1895, Japan had progressed from Korea into China, entering Manchuria, the Liaotung Peninsula, and Weihaiwei. From these positions it was in striking distance of Peking. Recognising defeat, Chinese surrender terms with Japan were negotiated at Shimonoseki in April. China handed Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, though subsequent international pressure led to the elimination of the latter region from the treaty.
[11] For the Daioyu Island controversy from China's perspective see Suganuma Unryu, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Daioyu/Senkaku Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000).
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