|
The Arrival of Europe and America in Asia and the End of Japan’s Seclusion
Ryukyu’s vassalage to China and Satsuma lasted until 1872. Change came as a result of domestic and external factors. Firstly, internal economic crisis afflicted Japan and Ryukyu in the early-19th century.[1] The Shogunate and daimyo had to become more frugal and institute economic reforms. Some were successful,[2] but most were not.[3] Second, was the arrival of more European vessels in the vicinity of Japan and a pattern of forced market acquisition. Ryukyu, vulnerable in location, constituted a foothold for any power seeking to challenge sakoku and 'open Japan.' Contact with foreign ships in Ryukyu had been common in the 17th and 18th centuries. Generally, a vessel would be blown off course and end up in need of food and repairs before setting off again. By the mid-19th century, however, many were warships deliberately making their way to Naha. The British and French arrived with aims in mind in the 1840’s.[4] Commodore Matthew Perry had instructions to expand America's trade in Asia and establish coaling stations along Japan's coast or in its uninhabited islands[5] and had authority to negotiate treaties. He had studied Japan and its relations with Ryukyu, and, in a report sent to US Navy command in 1852, stated that if Japan did not respond favourably to his calls for an end to sakoku he would anchor nearby in intimidatory fashion. Ryukyu was well-suited, in his view.[6] Perry’s proposal was approved by the President, though he was instructed to procure goods from islanders at fair prices and ensure his crew behaved impeccably. Force was sanctioned only if his crew came under attack.[7] Perry’s fleet arrived at Naha in May 1853.[8] Although he again petitioned Washington to go ahead with a Ryukyu occupation plan, it was rejected. After he concluded a treaty with Japan in 1854, however, Ryukyu had no leverage value. Perry had originally pushed for access to five Japanese ports, including Naha. Japanese negotiators responded to this by saying that since Ryukyu was a distant country neither the Emperor nor his government had any rights to confer access.[9]
Although sustained efforts by foreign powers forced Japan to open her ports, it was not universally welcomed, since the concluded treaties contained terms more favourable to the foreign powers than Japan.[10] It is unlikely any foreign power could have bullied the Shogunate into agreeing to such treaties if not for the weakened state of the central government and inadequacy of its internal defences. Moreover, years of isolation meant the Shogunate had only minimal knowledge about modern international diplomacy. Edo was barely able to control the regional daimyo once the sankin kotai system was relaxed: allowing them to retreat to their fortified domains, nor to prevent unrest among the hyakusho, let alone foreign intruders with advanced military know-how. A sense of desperation was illustrated by a desire to seek the assistance of the Imperial Family. The Edo government hardly got the support it was seeking, however, since the Imperial Court denounced the treaties. Thereafter, Japan divided into two main factions: those supporting sonno-joi (revere the Emperor and expel barbarians), and kaikoku (open the country). Satsuma and Choshu, two of Japan’s most powerful domains, initially supported the sonno-joi cause but shifted upon receiving a lesson in the destructive capability of foreign naval artillery. Once Satsuma and Choshu aligned with the Tosa and Hizen domains the end was near. In 1867, Tokugawa Yoshinobu surrendered government to the Emperor[11] and belatedly, in September 1869, the new era was designated as Meiji, or 'enlightenment.'
[1] Ryukyu was hit by typhoons, earthquakes, tidal waves, droughts, famines, and epidemics which claimed and estimated 20,000 lives. Considering the size of the population of Ryukyu at the time this was a very heavy toll. Kerr puts the population at between 150,000-200,000. George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (1958), 241. Sakihara Mitsugu states that whilst the population stood at 100,000 at the start of the 17th century it had risen to 280,000 by the mid-19th century. Sakihara Mitsugu The Significance of Ryukyu in Satsuma Finances During the Tokugawa Period (1971), 211. Yet these were not exclusive conditions. Strange weather hit Japan in the 1830’s, creating wide scale famine and high loss of life.
[2] A wonderful irony of the Tokugawa social hierarchy was that the lowly merchant class had become the most powerful segment of society by the 19th century. Sakihara Mitsugu estimates that in 1830 Satsuma was in debt to Osaka merchants to the sum of 5 million ryo of gold (5 million ryo of gold was equivalent to 320,000 kan of silver. One kan of silver was equivalent to 3.75 kilogrammes, or 8.27 pounds). Since annual income was somewhere in the region of 150,000-185,000 ryo of gold, and given the annual interest rate stood at 12% Shimazu is said to have announced it would take him 250 years to repay. Contrary to expectations, he restructured the terms of his debts so that he was now only obliged to pay 20,000 ryo per year and had amassed a sizeable reserve fund within 20 years. He had become adept at merchant capitalism. Most successful daimyo reformers followed the same route. Contributing factors in the case of Satsuma included improved sugar production and transportation, price manipulation to protect his monopoly on sugar, heavier local taxation, along with semi-legal (China-Ryukyu) and illegal (direct foreign intercourse and smuggling) trade. To this one should also add a capacity for guile. To give two examples of incoming revenues for Shimazu after his reforms, sugar exports brought in close to 25,000 ryo per year from 1830-1839, and Ryukyu-China trade some 70,000 ryo. Sakihara Mitsugu The Significance of Ryukyu in Satsuma Finances During the Tokugawa Period (1971), 221, 228 and 240.
[3] The Shogunate belatedly responded to this in the 1840’s. Officials were accused of fraud or wasteful use of government revenues and dismissed in large number. Merchants, and the daimyo with whom they were in cahoots, were charged with manipulation of the price of basic goods, creating wild fluctuations that benefited the manipulators but was bad for the general population. Try as it may, however, the government only ever had limited success in destroying this system and breaking daimyo monopolies. It fared better in increasing its revenues by ordering contributions from merchants for land reclamation and redistribution projects and by instituting the agechi rei system, by which daimyo were obliged to return portions of their fiefs to Edo control. Obviously, the daimyo disliked this sudden reassertion of Tokugawa authority after years of relative autonomy. It should be seen as an important motivating factor in the revolution that would follow.
[4] In 1844, the French ship Alcmene docked at Naha demanding establishment of trade relations. Shuri, under orders from Satsuma, refused. Likewise when the British vessel Starling arrived in 1846. Both countries were permitted to leave a missionary behind ostensibly for language study. Although records kept by the Frenchman Forcade and the Hungarian-born British representative Bettelheim are of interest now, Shuri regarded them as a nuisance. Bettelheim abused the hospitality accorded him in myriad ways. Moreover, it was he who presented an American naval commander with a less-than-flattering portrait of Ryukyu in 1848. For a description of problems caused by Bettelheim see George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 279-295. For an account of missionaries in Ryukyu see Edward E. Bollinger, On the Threshold of a Closed Empire: Mid-19th Century Missions in Okinawa (Pasadena, California: William Carey Library, 1991).
[5] The Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands located south of Tokyo at about the same latitude as Ryukyu were targeted. Miyasato Seigen, 'Perry raiko,' in Hosoya Chihiro, ed. Nichibei kankeishi: masatsu to kyocho no 130 nen (Tokyo: Yuhikakusensho, 1982), 175-178.
[6] Because it was under the control of one of Japan’s most powerful daimyo, but that the people of Ryukyu had suffered only oppression under this regime. In his own words, "liberating the islanders from this regime and occupying the region would be the most appropriate and morally-correct course of action. As far as I am concerned, it would improve the lives of the islanders. Without doubt, they [Ryukyuans] would welcome America." Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 319.
[7] Contrary to instructions he threatened and applied force. On 25th July, he told Shuri that if he were not allowed access or lease to required facilities and areas for a coaling station and trading purposes, he would send 200 troops to occupy Shuri castle. The Ryukyu government surrendered unconditionally.
[8] On Perry’s visit see Kerr’s Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 297-341, and Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 313-330. For the more curious, see Hokama Seisho's excellent Commodore Perry's Visit to Okinawa: Selections From Narratives of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan (Naha: Kyuyodo Shobo, 1975).
[9] George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 330. This was confirmation of Perry’s impression that Ryukyu was an independent entity. On returning to Naha, therefore, he concluded a treaty specifically related to American interests. The 'Compact between the United States and the Ryukyu Kingdom' was signed in July 1854, and ratified by the US Senate the following year. Since Japan had been prised open there was little subsequent interest in Ryukyu. Only later, when the US gained control over Okinawa after W.W.II, does this interlude take on a renewed significance.
[10] The Ryukyu-US treaty was typical. Americans were "at liberty to ramble where they please, without hindrance, or having officials sent to follow them." If they committed crimes while in port they would be punished by "the captain of the ship to which they belong" rather than local authorities. George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (1958), 335. The concept of extraterritoriality: a foreign citizen being immune from local penalties for crimes, was born during this period, but one still sees it within the various 'Status of Forces Agreements' (SOFA) governing the treatment of US troops stationed abroad. This is especially pertinent in the case of Okinawa.
[11] Some stragglers attempted to resist the inevitable, escaping to Hokkaido and establishing an Ezo Republic with its administrative capital at Goryokaku, but this was crushed in May 1869.
|
|
|