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Life Under Satsuma and Qing China through to Annexation by Japan in 1879


Shimazu’s conquest had been conducted as a demonstration of loyalty to the new Shogun, but his need to secure control over a vital source of revenue was a more pressing concern. The Shogun had not confiscated all Satsuma lands,[1] but had reduced the size of the domain and imposed a higher level of taxation. Clearly, Shimazu had to tighten up his financial affairs. He demanded no less of the Ryukyu King and Ofu. Whilst taking complete control of all aspects of China trade, Shimazu Iehisa's 'Fifteen Article Ordinance' (okite jugojo) banned the practice of financial awards to mistresses or on the basis of family origins, stressing that rewards should only be given in recognition of public service.[2] The King was instructed to keep temple and shrine construction within reasonable limits. Shimazu was aware of the relative decline in the kingdom's economy since exit from Southeast Asia and was not insensitive to the situation. Yet Shuri was still involved in tributary trade with China lucrative enough for Shimazu to make every effort to avoid interruptions. At the same time, to obtain maximum benefit from this trade he would have to ensure Shuri not fritter away more than necessary and that it learn to administer resources more efficiently. Although there are many recorded lapses, this new period under Satsuma is marked by a high degree of skill in resource management and efficiency in agricultural productivity and government organisation. The Ofu bureaucracy would come to play a far more visible role in the agrarian communities.

Though there developed a good deal of complexity to the system in later years, Shuri was obliged to pay taxes and tributes to Satsuma and lose control over trade with China.[3] Tribute tax was derived from the assessed productive capacity of all Ryukyuan lands. In 1611, on completion of surveys, Satsuma agents set the rice koku value of the Ryukyus at 89,086, of which some 50,000 koku (56% of the total) was assessed as royal family income.[4] Of the tax system in mainland Japan there was a correlation between population size and koku valuations. Since historians agree that the population figure at the start of the 17th century was around 100,000, Satsuma's valuation can be seen as consistent with mainland levying standards, and as reasonably lenient. From the total koku value assessment, Shimazu received an annual payment of 8,783 koku,[5] about an eighth of which was in textiles rather than rice. The assessed tax figure for Shimazu was actually 11,933 koku, but transportation costs to Kagoshima for which Shuri was liable had to be factored in.[6] In addition, a personal tribute from the King's coffers was requested which was as much as 8,000 koku again. The largest amount of revenue coming from Ryukyu, however, was Shimazu’s share of Ryukyu-China trade, estimated at as much as 100,000 koku per year.[7] To put this in context, the total annual revenue of the Satsuma domain at the time stood at about 700,000 koku.[8] As such, income from Ryukyu accounted for 17% of Satsuma's total income during the early- to mid-17th century.

It is common practice to attack the 270-year period of Satsuma rule, isolating it as Japan's first taste of colonial exploitation. The prevalent tendency is to link this with postwar debates on US bases in Okinawa and the Government of Japan's (GOJ) complicity with a Japan-US security alliance system that maintains them. However, there are significant problems with the argument. On the one hand, and in terms of the way we have come to define the concept, this certainly was colonialism with all attached negativity. The kingdom was taken, looted, and fell under the absolute authority of Shimazu who imposed taxes and held the threat of punishment for failure to comply with directives like a blade to the throat. On the other, and in terms of the political situation of the day, it was more complex. One must balance associated inflammatory words like conquest, exploitation, and tyranny: which pop up time and time again in discussions about this period, against the degree to which the new system suited Ryukyu within a rapidly changing geopolitical and geoeconomic environment and in terms of its internal modernisation requirements.[9] Proponents of what may be called 'exploitation continuity theories' generally avoid such historical grey matter and consequently contemporary debate suffers. Ryukyu sat in a vulnerable location at a time when China could not offer vassals protection, itself under threat from European powers acquiring territories in the Asian region apace.[10] Colonialism was on the rise throughout Asia in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Another argument holds that Shimazu was tyrannous, with his tax demands in particular leading to wide scale poverty and exploitation of the people. In truth, these demands were not as heavy as legend has it during the first two centuries of Satsuma rule and, perhaps most importantly, were quite egalitarian. The tribute tax, which fell mainly on agrarian households, was difficult to achieve if a harvest was poor. Yet while the figure was about 15% of assessed productivity in 1611, the real term figure was much higher after the introduction and improved production of high value crops like imo and sugar cane in the 17th century, and with the opening of more land for cultivation.[11] The imo became a staple food item throughout Ryukyu, while sugar the main item for export to Japan. Droughts, famines, and violent typhoons were common, but the average household dealt with these as ever, being prosperous neither before nor after the Satsuma conquest. Those located at the bottom rung of the social hierarchy started at zero, but progressed to zero. In this sense poverty was relative. If anything, the field was levelled. Those high in the social hierarchy felt the pinch, losing relatively more. Arguably, this was a positive development of Satsuma rule. Only extreme monarchists can work from the proper philosophical foundation to legitimately vilify the Lord of Satsuma. He took most from the Ofu and social elite who were the biggest consumers and who had been, and continued to be, guilty of squeezing whatever they could from agrarian households. For the benefit of the latter Satsuma introduced better systems of food production and resource management.[12]

Furthermore, all of Japan was afflicted by this early-19th century crisis which, in part, led to the fall of the Tokugawa. While siphoning trade profits and collecting taxes Shimazu did not escape obligation-free. Flexibility had to be shown in times of economic hardship and actual financial assistance to Shuri was necessary when a Chinese cefeng mission was due in port. The Chinese Emperor's tianshi, or 'celestial envoy,' would arrive with a retinue of at least 300 people, expecting lavish treatment and accommodation for the duration of their stay. This was the price for Shimazu had to pay to keep China-Ryukyu relations plodding along happily.[13] This became of greater importance after the new shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu prohibited all foreign intercourse, except that with China and Holland via Dejima Port in Nagasaki. This official sakoku, or exclusion policy, remained in effect for more than two centuries.



[1] Sakihara Mitsugu contends that Satsuma was in not defeated after the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, and was in fact ready to take Tokugawa on in battle if forced to do so. Tokugawa decided to leave the Satsuma domain essentially intact rather than embark on a tricky subjugation mission to the south. Tokugawa-Satsuma relations appear to have become cordial after Shimazu Iehisa visited Edo in 1603 to submit to the centralised authority of Tokugawa. See Sakihara's afterword in George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 560.

[2] Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 161-162.

[3] There were all sorts of land taxes, poll taxes, special produce taxes, and miscellaneous taxes. For the most interesting and comprehensive study of the Ryukyu-Satsuma financial relationship during the period in English see: Sakihara Mitsugu, The Significance of Ryukyu in Satsuma Finances During the Tokugawa Period (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1971).

[4] Higa Shuncho, Okinawa no rekishi (1959), 158, and Okinawa-kenshi 1 - tsushi, 26. The koku value was reassessed by Satsuma on 3 subsequent occasions, the last being in 1727 when the figure was increased to 94,230 koku. A chart showing the precise breakdown per region of the 1727 productivity assessment can be found in: Ryukyu Seifu, Okinawa-kenshi 3 - keizai (Tokyo: Kokusho Kanko Kai, 1972), 79. 68% of the total assessment was for Okinawa Island.

[5] See the afterword in George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 562.

[6] Ibid., 562.

[7] George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 179.

[8] Ibid., 179.

[9] The 18th century Okinawan statesman, Sai On, for example, is to this day respected throughout the islands for the practical policies he instituted to cope with population increases and the protection and successful management of the island's fragile resources. At the same time, one wonders under what conditions such practical long-term planning could have been possible. He was under no illusions as to the forced basis of Satsuma authority over Ryukyu, yet nor was he blind to the faults of the Ryukyu administration that preceded it. The nature of life in Ryukyu in the aftermath of Satsuma's invasion is a difficult and emotive issue to tackle, but it is too simplistic a position by far to characterise it as a period of colonial exploitation and utter misery.

[10] Ryukyu could have been taken by the Dutch (Malacca 1641, Ceylon 1660, Zelandia Castel 1624), Portuguese (Malacca 1511, Macao 1557, Goa 1510, Ceylon 1510), French (Pondicherry 1673, Chandernagore 1676), British (Bengal 1765, Madras 1639), or Spanish (Philippines 1571).

[11] The Satsuma kenchi of Ryukyu in 1611 made an official koku assessment for Ryukyu of 89,086 based on lands then under cultivation and productivity. At that time there were about 15,000 acres of dry field and 6,000 acres of irrigated land under cultivation. At the time of the 1750 kenchi, however, there were now 36,000 acres of dry field and 8,000 acres of irrigated land under cultivation. The population had increased rapidly in the intervening years, of course, but productivity had increased even more dramatically with more lands, more resilient crops, and better farming techniques. 

[12] Respected historian Sakihara Mitsugu is one of only a tiny handful to have thoroughly examined Ryukyu-Satsuma relations from this perspective. In the opening paragraph of his Ph.D. abstract he offers the following distillation of his research: "Contrary to the popular notion that Satsuma nearly enslaved the Ryukyuans after the 1609 conquest, this study indicates that Satsuma's policy toward Ryukyu was relatively moderate until about 1830 when Satsuma embarked upon the Tempo financial reform. It was only then that for purposes of financial recovery Satsuma started to intensify exploitation of Ryukyu's resources and trade. Ryukyu's economic exhaustion at the beginning of the Meiji period has too often been assumed to have begun in 1609, but should be dated from 1830. Moreover, this study points out that for the deplorable condition of Ryukyu in the late 19th century, Ryukyu's own ruling class had to share the responsibility along with the officials in Satsuma." Sakihara Mitsugu, The Significance of Ryukyu in Satsuma Finances During the Tokugawa Period (1971), iv. Thirty years on from this dissertation and Sakihara was persisting with a deconstruction of the myths surrounding Satsuma's role in Ryukyu. One should consult his afterword in George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), particularly 544-547, and 560-566.

[13] The Ming Court was notified of Satsuma's invasion in 1612 and suspended relations with the Ryukyus. After considerable prompting, assisted by the fortuitous succession of King Sho Ho to the throne in 1621 that would necessitate an investiture, the Ming Court agreed to resume tributary relations. These did not immediately resume with the same frequency as before, with China allowing tribute missions only once per decade until 1633, but Shuri's loyalty over the years, regardless of the island kingdom's current status was well-recognised by the Ming. It was noted that Liuqiu had never failed to send tribute, whatever the conditions. US OSS, The Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands: A Japanese Minority Group, 54. Luckily for Satsuma, perhaps, there were only 8 investiture missions dispatched to Okinawa between 1644 and 1879. Ta-tuan Ch’en, 'Investiture of Liu-Ch’iu Kings in the Ch’ing Period,' in John King Fairbank, editor. The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), 136.


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