Relations between Ryukyu and Japan span centuries, but were not formalised until the 15th century. Ryukyu vessels began conducting trade missions to Korea and Japan from the late-14th into 15th century. At times ships bypassed Japan on voyages to Korea, but more often ported at Kagoshima or Hakata in Kyushu, from there following Japan’s Inland Sea to Sakai en route to Kyoto.[1] Gifts were given when ties were established and on subsequent trips. Most important, is that at the start of the 15th century neither Japan nor Satsuma were claiming ownership of Ryukyu. There are records of the Muromachi Shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimochi, sending a letter to King Sho Shisho in 1416 addressing him as Ryukyu koku no yo no nushi, or 'Master of the Country of Ryukyu.'[2] While choosing the Japanese literation Ryukyu rather than the Chinese word Liuqiu, references to a 'Country of Ryukyu' were identical with Ming records. Both countries recognised Ryukyu koku as a distinct political community.
A shift occurred in the mid-15th century. While Japan had a capital and head of state, real powers had long dispersed into the regions, seized by the daimyo, or feudal lords. The daimyo operated their own economies, including foreign trade or piracy, and felt no obligation to support Kyoto. Shimazu of Satsuma, one of the more powerful daimyo, had the wisdom to formalise trade with Korea's Li Dynasty in 1395, sending 120 missions from then to 1504.[3] Kagoshima was already a port of call for Ryukyuan ships and Shimazu saw that this could work to further advantage. Ryukyu vessels arrived with exotic wares that were in short supply in the Japan-Korea region and were keen to develop these markets. The main threat was rampant piracy in the area. Recognising this, Shimazu entered into a profitable arrangement by offering Kagoshima as marketplace for goods from Naha and agreeing to bodyguard Ryukyu vessels. Shogun Ashikaga Yoshinori was aware of these developments and, therefore, eager to establish good relations with Shimazu. If little else, he could still award tokens of power or legitimacy. On a whim, in 1441, Yoshinori conferred rights of jurisdiction over Ryukyu to Shimazu Tadakuni of Satsuma.[4] Although Shuri was oblivious to this transfer of sovereignty, and while it had no legal credibility, Shimazu became more paternalistic. This worsened after Shimazu received shogunal authority to monitor Ryukyu ships and trade in 1471 and 1480.[5] Shuri appears to have taken a pragmatic approach to these irritations in order to maintain a quiet existence, but must, at some point, have realised that something was decidedly awry.[6]
Oda Nobunaga installed Ashikaga Yoshiaki as a puppet Shogun in 1568, and by his death in 1582 had militarily wiped out or tamed the daimyo, bringing Japan to the verge of peace and political unification. The task was completed by Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Such was the swiftness of the process that by the closing decade of the 16th century Hideyoshi had set his sights on expansion into Korea and China. In 1590, Shimazu Yoshihisa was told that Ryukyu would be required to contribute troops and provisions toward the invasion of Korea. Shimazu, knowing this would be tricky, asked that Shuri's obligation be to provide only supplies.[7] With consent Shimazu forwarded a letter to King Sho Nei in 1591, asking that a 10-month supply of provisions for 7,000 men be delivered to Bonotsu in early-1592.[8] Sho Nei, anxious not to become embroiled, ignored the demand. Caught between the Shogun's demands and Sho Nei’s refusals, Shimazu dispatched agents to Naha who were told Ryukyu was too poor to fulfil such requirements since foreign trade had been curtailed. A token shipment was sent in 1593, but by then the invasion had failed. Shuri sent word to China requesting assistance and warning of Japan's desire for territorial expansion into Asia.
Shuri's sense of impending doom proved warranted. Upon Hideyoshi’s death a power struggle erupted between factions loyal to him and to Tokugawa Ieyasu, culminating in the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. In 1603, Tokugawa emerged triumphant and established the Edo or Tokugawa Shogunate. Shimazu Yoshihiro of Satsuma had sided against Tokugawa in battle and was immediately stripped of title but his successors were treated leniently, if with caution. His successor, Shimazu Iehisa, visited Edo to pay his respects the new Shogun and advised Ryukyu King Sho Nei to do likewise. As usual, perhaps unaware of the magnitude of political change in Japan, Shuri refused. On previous occasions Shimazu might have made excuses, but his was now a more difficult position within the new order. Shimazu asked Ieyasu's consent to deploy a punitive task force to the islands and in February 1609, General Kabayama set sail from Kagoshima with 3,000 men in 100 vessels.[9] There were minor skirmishes en route, but Ryukyu posed little resistance. On 5th April, Sho Nei surrendered Shuri and was transported with senior officials to Kagoshima to be, as Kerr notes, paraded as the first "foreign monarch" to submit to Japanese authority.[10]
Throughout 1610, Satsuma bugyo, or magistrates, with a staff of 168, began surveying (kenchi) all islands of the Ryukyus to assess their koku value.[11] In 1611, all islands north of and including Amami were incorporated into the Satsuma fiefdom and were therefore not included in the final koku valuation of Ryukyu. In September, Sho Nei was told that he could return to his kingdom provided he put his signature to a pledge (meiyakusho) known as the 'King's Oath:' the gist being that the present situation had been brought upon the kingdom by Sho Nei's disrespect for the Shogun. He had to agree that it was now only because of Shimazu’s generosity that he could resume his duties. Most importantly, he had to concur with the ludicrous statement that "the islands of Ryukyu have from ancient times been a feudal dependency of Satsuma."[12] Senior Ofu ministers, including the Sessei and Sanshikan, were similarly told to recognise Satsuma authority from ancient times and pledge loyalty. Shimazu dispatched a head-monitoring official, or zaiban bugyo and staff to reside in Naha and demanded that a Ryukyu minister of Sanshikan rank, called zaiban ufuyaku (oyakata) be resident in Kagoshima. As Sakihara points out, Ryukyu were thereafter listed in the official writ of stipend granted to Satsuma by the Tokugawa Shogunate.[13]
[1] There are records of seven trade missions, or tabi, to the Muromachi Shogunate in Kyoto from 1403 and 1448. George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 136.
[2] Okinawa-kenshi 1 - tsushi (1976), 4. There are many references in history texts to the 1416 letter.
[3] Technically, Satsuma became a tributary of the Li Dynasty, but Shimazu accepted this since large profits were to be made. George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 136.
[4] Higaonna Kanjun, Ryukyu no rekishi (1957), 73, and Higa Shuncho, Shimoda Seiji and Shinzato Keiji, ed. Okinawa (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963), 78. The overall rationale was intriguing. While rejecting the basis of the Ming system whereby tribute was paid in recognition of China’s greatness and that country henceforth became a vassal state of China, the system could be adopted if tribute were paid to Japan. Ashikaga retrospectively accepted gifts from Ryukyu as tribute and regarded Ryukyu as vassal state, sovereignty over which could be given to whomever.
[5] Okinawa-kenshi 1 - tsushi, 6. This is probably the first example of an alteration of Ryukyu-Japan history to suit Japan's interests. Ashikaga established a precedent used on subsequent occasions.
[6] Though this may be seen as naivety, one struggles to think of another strategy. If Shuri had flirted with the idea of severing relations Shimazu would likely have resorted to force. He already possessed a formidable military and economy. When the sengoku jidai, or 'Civil War Era,' broke out in Japan in 1467, Shimazu flourished, conquering Kyushu by the late-16th century. Mainland warfare meant little for Shuri. Routines established with Satsuma continued, even if orders were barked more frequently. The main change was cultural as more Japanese ships made their way to Naha, heightening interest in things Japanese. A familiarity with Japanese became of use for those in Naha and Tomari, and amongst the upper hierarchy at Shuri. The ruralities remained as unaffected by Japanese as Chinese before it. The various dialects of Ryukyuan (uchinaguchi) were prevalent among the mass population, with Chinese the language of government and bureaucracy.
[7] This sums up the confusion regarding Ryukyu's political status within the main Japanese islands and helps explain later developments. Although the sovereignty of Ryukyu had been tossed about, on paper at least, for 150 years, Satsuma had never exercised control over the economic or political affairs of the kingdom. Toyotomi's demand that Shuri supply troops and supplies was based on his ignorance of the reality and must have come as a shock to Shimazu. His request for a supply-only contribution was based on his knowledge that Ryukyu, as neither territory nor ally of Japan's, would feel under no obligation to Toyotomi. Having been outed, of course, Shimazu had to resolve the situation or face loss of credibility. This would be tricky given the new political order in Japan within which Satsuma's position was precarious. Shimazu's invasion of Ryukyu in 1609 was clearly a case of him protecting his political livelihood, but the roots of the decision can surely be traced back 18 years earlier.
[8] Matsuda Mitsugu, The Government of the Kingdom of Ryukyu, 1609-1872 (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1967), 5.
[9] Although there is division among historians as to the exact size of the force sent by Shimazu, with some suggesting a smaller number, the above figures appear most frequently.
[10] George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 160.
[11] A koku equals approximately 180 litres. Below it in terms of units of measurement is the to, equalling about 18 litres, and the sho, which equals approximately 1.8 litres.
[12] George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (2000), 160-161, and Majikina Anko and Shimakura Ryuji, Okinawa Issennenshi, (1966), 367.
[13] Sakihara Mitsugu, 'The History of Okinawa,' in Ethnic Studies Oral History Project, Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii (Honolulu: Ethnic University of Hawaii, 1981), 10.
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