Okinawa suffered comprehensive devastation during the war. A large majority of all private housing, public buildings, and transportation infrastructure to the island's south lay in waste.[1] Public utilities were largely inoperable. Crops and farmland had been shredded by shelling and bombardment. Livestock had been inadvertently slaughtered during the hail of metal or consumed by civilians and retreating Japanese troops. There was no option but to rebuild. The big difference was that Japan was now no longer Okinawa's master.[2] Victory in the Battle for Okinawa gave the United States (US) de facto authority in the region. It could not unilaterally decide on the shape of postwar policy toward Japan and Okinawa, given that the Pacific War was an allied effort involving the United Kingdom (UK), Nationalist China, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but the US certainly played the largest single role in the campaign against Japan and sought a postwar role commensurate with its wartime sacrifices.[3] US Army General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), succeeded in blocking implementation of any policy not consistent with his own views.[4]
The US had no solid plans for Okinawa during the very early postwar period. In the aftermath of war American forces did their best to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population through provision of food, clothing, shelter, and medical assistance. The goal had been to launch a major assault on mainland Japan from Okinawa, hence a build up of troops and equipment, but the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, led swiftly to surrender. With the need for assault on the mainland gone there appeared no compelling reason for US forces to stay long-term. Yet as de facto administering authority, regardless of whether it intended to remain for any length of time, it fell on the US to initiate the rebuilding. In outlining Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands (MGR) objectives in December 1945, SCAP ordered that living standards be restored "consistent with those existing prior to the war," a "sound programme of economic development should be instituted" helping Okinawa achieve the highest level of economic independence, and that "a self-governing community should be established" as early as possible.[5] Though US efforts met with much success in the first few years, given Okinawa's state of ruin, there came a freeze in progress. There were several reasons for this.
First, the long-term political status of Okinawa had yet to be decided. The US Congress was unwilling to pour investment in if Okinawa was soon to be returned to Japan. Debate amongst the Allied Powers on the disposition of former territories had resulted in accord that Japan be expelled from areas "taken by violence and greed."[6] No mention of Okinawa was made, suggesting that the islands were seen as an integral part of Japan. Later statements were also ambiguous, with the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945: which constituted the terms by which Japan surrendered, talking of Japan's sovereignty limited to the four main islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, Hokkaido and "such minor islands as we determine."[7] Here Okinawa is highly conspicuous in its absence. Allied planners were now either genuinely unsure of Okinawa's status vis-a-vis Japan, deliberately holding the islands with some specific objective in mind,[8] or just hedging bets by delaying a decision. Second, upon Japan's surrender the US was financing an occupation of the mainland and Okinawa simultaneously. Funds and manpower were devoted to the demilitarisation of Japan so that it would never again become a "menace to the peace and security of the world,"[9] yet US taxpayers could not be expected to continue financing the reconstruction of a former adversary without return. This economic situation could not be divorced from the ongoing debate on the status of Japan and Okinawa. Finally, conflict between the Army and Navy on how Okinawan lands seized during wartime would be distributed hindered resettlement and other MGR civilian development projects.[10] This, in turn, led to morale problems among personnel involved with reconstruction efforts.[11]
[1] On the dislocation of civilian life see 'Report of Military Government Activities for Period From 1st April 1945 to 1st July 1946,' reprinted in Okinawa-ken Bunka Shinkokai., editor, Okinawa-kenshi: shiryohen 9 - Military Government Activities Reports (Naha: Okinawa-ken Kyoiku Iinkai, 2000), 5-6.
[2] By Article I and II of 'United States Navy Military Government, Proclamation No. 1' issued by Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas and Military Governor of the Islands of Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters, on 5th April 1945, "All powers of government and jurisdiction in the Islands…and over the inhabitants thereof, and final administrative responsibility are vested in me as Fleet Admiral…commanding the forces of occupation and as Military Governor...All powers of the Government of Japanese Empire are hereby suspended." Gekkan Okinawa Sha, editor, Laws and Regulations During the US Administration of Okinawa, 1945-1972 (Naha, Ikemiya Shokai and Company, undated), 38. An amendment was issued by Rear Admiral John Price, Chief Military Government Officer, under 'Navy Military Government Proclamation No. 1-A,' 26th November 1945, specifying that the administered area were the islands and waters "south of thirty (30) degrees North Latitude," Ibid., 41-42. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur, formally separated Okinawa's administration from Japan in the 'Jakkan no gaikaku chiiki o seijijo gyoseijo Nihon kara bunretsusuru koto ni kansuru oboegaki (memorandum)' on 29th January 1946. Nampo Doho Engokai, Okinawa fukki no kiroku (Tokyo: Bunshodo, 1972), 279-280.
[3] The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) were established in December 1945 to determine the shape of postwar policy toward Japan. The FEC was charged with formulating policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the surrender terms would be accomplished, but was powerless in Okinawa since it could not make recommendations on the conduct of military operations or territorial adjustments. The ACJ was a purely consultative body consisting of the four veto powers of the Soviet Union, British Commonwealth, US, and Nationalist China (under Chiang Kai-Shek). The US presided over both with Douglas MacArthur instituted as chairman. 'Agreement of the Foreign Ministers at Moscow on Establishing the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan,' 27th December 1945. Kashima Heiwa Kenkyusho, Nihon gaiko shuyo bunsho: nenpyo - 1941-1960 (Tokyo: Genshobo, 1983), 89-90.
[4] For a discussion of the FEC, ACJ, and the role of MacArthur see George H. Blakeslee, The Far Eastern Commission (Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, Far Eastern Series 60, 1953), and Gordon Daniels, 'Nationalist China in the Allied Council: Policies toward Japan, 1946-1952,' Hokkaido Law Review, November 1976.
[5] Objectives of the Military Government as determined by Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the Far East (CINCFE), in December 1945. US Department of the Army, Army General Staff, MacArthur in Japan; The Occupation - Military Phase (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1966), 86. Government Printing Office hereafter abbreviated to GPO.
[6] US, Department of State (DoS), Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter abbreviated to FRUS) Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1961), 448-449.
[7] US, DoS, FRUS, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume Two (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1960), 1474-1476.
[8] On Okinawa's ambiguous position see Ota Masahide, 'The Occupation of Okinawa and "Postwar Reforms" of Japan,' Ryukyu Daigaku Hobungakubu Kiyo 24 (1981), 72-83.
[9] State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) 'US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,' 6th September 1945. This was an action plan elaborated out of the principles contained in the Potsdam Declaration and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender of 2nd September 1945.
[10] Land allocation was a significant problem. Between them the Navy and Army still possessed 40,000 acres of Okinawa Island's total of 92,000 acres of arable land as of mid-1946. Both branches were averse to handing any of this land back while the permanence of their roles on Okinawa had yet to be determined, and equally averse to having civilian settlements in proximity to these tracts. A May 1946 MGR report remarked that this made their job particularly tough in that: "Separate and explicit authorisation had to be secured for each strip of land which was resettled." 'Report of Military Government Activities for Period From 1st April 1945 to 1st July 1946,' in Okinawa-ken Bunka Shinkokai., editor, Okinawa-kenshi: shiryohen 9 - Military Government Activities Reports (Naha: Okinawa-ken Kyoiku Iinkai, 2000), 7.
[11] Those interested in the MGR's early reconstruction efforts should locate in addition to the above-mentioned Okinawa-kenshi: shiryohen 9 - Military Government Activities Reports, Daniel Karasik, 'Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction,' Far Eastern Quarterly 2 (1948), Leonard Weiss, 'US Military Government on Okinawa,' Far Eastern Survey July (1946), Arnold G. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyus, 1945-1950 (Washington, DC: Army Historical Series, US Army, 1988), and Ryukyu Ginko, Sengo Okinawa keizashi (Naha: Ryukyu Ginko, 1984), especially Chapters 1-4.
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